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Abstract: Much French philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies has been marked by the positive valorization of alterity, an ethical position that 
has recently received a vigorous assault from Alain Badiou’s privilege of sameness. 
This article argues that Badiou shares a great deal in common with the philosophies of 
alterity from which he seeks to distance himself, and that Michel Serres’s little-known 
account of alterity offers a much more radical alternative to the ethics of difference. 
Drawing on both translated and as yet untranslated works, I argue that the Serresian 
ontology of inclination, along with his conceptual personae of the hermaphrodite and 
the parasite, informs ethical and political positions that offer a distinctive ethics and 
politics that present fresh insights about the relation between the singular and the 
universal, the contingency of market exchange, and the nature of violence.
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It has pleased more than one historian of recent French philosophy to characterize the twentieth century in terms of a preoccupation with alterity and difference. Foremost among such historians is Vincent 
Descombes, whose influential Modern French Philosophy foregrounds the theme 
in its original French title.1 Descombes notes the positive ethical charge accorded 
to alterity in this period by those philosophies that resist any attempt “to translate 
the other into the language of the same,” that is, “[t]o temper the brutal element 
of existence, to absorb the heterogeneous, to give meaning to the senseless, to 
rationalize the incongruous.”2
Prominent among Anglophone assessments of this trend in recent French 
thought is Todd May’s 1997 Reconsidering Difference. May identifies difference 
as a “pattern” that has “emerged in the French philosophy of this generation, of 
the generation running roughly from the mid to late sixties up to the present,”3 
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prominent among which are Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, 
and Jean-Luc Nancy. What is common to these thinkers, May argues, is a shared 
problem of how to “valorize” difference, or in other words how to code it ethically. 
Indeed, he evokes an “obsession with the other” in this period,4 and he echoes 
Descombes in his judgment that “[t]o cast the issue in terms common to many 
Continentalists, the problem is how to avoid reducing difference to the logic of the 
same.”5 Whatever important dissimilarities there are between Levinas, Derrida, 
Deleuze, and Nancy, May argues, they all share a positive valorization of difference 
and they all resist reducing alterity to the same.
In the early 2000s, however, the tide decisively turned against alterity and 
difference in some quarters, and no single volume more succinctly or more 
polemically inveighed against the positive valorization of otherness than Alain 
Badiou’s Ethics. Whereas the philosophers of difference saw alterity as the key to 
a radical ethics and politics, Badiou argued that according positive ethical charge 
to alterity and difference forecloses any true ethics. Badiou’s own position is not 
that we need less alterity than the philosophers of difference would like, but that 
we already have much, much more: “Infinite alterity is quite simply what there 
is,”6 and “[t]here are as many differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a 
young Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including 
myself. As many, but also, then, neither more nor less.”7 For Badiou, then, alterity 
and difference are neither philosophically interesting nor ethically privileged.
Badiou’s own proposal is radical: “the whole ethical predication based upon 
recognition of the other should be purely and simply abandoned.”8 All the philo-
sophical interest, and indeed the ethical import, for Badiou is not on the side of 
the other but of the same, where the same is understood not as what is but as “what 
comes to be” in a truth.9 This means that “[t]he only genuine ethics is of truths 
in the plural—or, more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of truth, of the 
labor that brings some truths into the world.”10 The ethics of truths is “indifferent 
to differences”11 and so, as Badiou memorably notes, the truth has no dreadlocks.12
So it is that we are faced today with two major philosophies of sameness and 
difference, rhetorically antagonistic and each with its attendant ethics and poli-
tics. On the one hand we have the various philosophers of difference—Deleuze, 
Derrida, Nancy, and Levinas prominent among them—who, each in their own 
way, positively code alterity and give it a prominent place in their ethics. On the 
other hand there is Badiou’s philosophy of the same, for which it is sameness, not 
alterity, that carries a positive ethical charge.
It is not my purpose in these pages to arbitrate between these two broad 
tendencies. Indeed, it is my argument that to seek to do so would risk missing 
something very important that they share, something even more important than 
their differences. What Badiou and his antagonists have in common is the as-
sumption that sameness and otherness are fundamentally and originally distinct, 
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and that the two terms can unproblematically receive contrasting ethical values. 
Badiou’s own valorization of sameness over a ubiquitous and uninteresting infinite 
difference does not challenge the distinction between identity and alterity on which 
the philosophies of difference rely. In fact, there is a series of striking similarities 
between the philosophers of difference and his own thought. For Badiou, differ-
ence is banal, trivial and ubiquitous, in the same way that, for the philosophers of 
difference, the reduction of the other to the same in Aristotelian logic, in language, 
and in politics is ubiquitous and simply what “there is,” understood as a Heideg-
gerian es gibt. The philosophies of difference and Badiou’s philosophy of the same 
also share the assumption that only one of the two terms (sameness or difference) 
can carry a preeminent positive ethical value, differing only on the small matter 
of whether it is sameness or difference that receives this unique positive coding. 
Once again, just as the philosophers of difference claim that alterity is only ever 
one infelicitous totalization away from being reduced to the same, for Badiou 
truths require their subject to maintain a vigilant, persevering fidelity if they are 
not to be dissolved into the endless circulation of opinion or into self-interest.13 
In short, Badiou’s disagreement with the philosophers of difference only makes 
sense in the context of the ample common ground that they share with his own 
philosophy of the same.
Serres’s Ontology of Inclination and Orientation
What we find in the thought of Michel Serres, by contrast, is a more radical 
critique and transformation of the ethics of alterity than Badiou is able to offer.14 
Unlike Badiou, Serres questions not merely the privilege of the same over the 
other but the very nature of the distinction between those two terms, a distinction 
that subtends—and unites—Badiou’s own position with that of his antagonists. 
The rest of this article will explore Serres’s break not only with the philosophy of 
difference but with the very opposition between, and contrasting ethical charge 
accorded to, sameness and alterity, a contrasting charge upon which both Badiou 
and his antagonists rely, and which they jointly perpetuate.
We can begin to gain a sense of just how radically Serres departs from the 
orthodoxy of sameness and alterity if we consider his account of existence, which 
approximates neither to Badiou’s ontology of inconsistent multiplicity about which 
nothing can be said, nor to an ontology of radical alterity or incommensurability 
for which “every other is wholly other.”15 His account of existence is presented 
over the course of his many books in a series of figures that intentionally resist 
reduction either to sameness or to alterity as they are conceived by Badiou and 
his antagonists, figures of inclination, orientation, and asymmetry, of parasites 
and multiplicities, of limping, falling, and drifting.
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Consistent across many of Serres’s discussions of existence is the motif of 
inclination:16 everything inclines in an asymmetrical way, spinning, leaning, or 
drifting. This, he maintains, is the basic condition of all existence, from atoms and 
stars through snail shells and human bodies (the left breast is statistically larger 
than the right, he informs us) to languages, manufactured objects, and cultures. 
Indeed the universe itself came into being, according to a theory to which Serres 
refers on multiple occasions, as a rupture of symmetry:17
The stars turn and advance, oriented, like particles around the nucleus of an 
atom. Crystals and molecules are lateralized, with highly refined symmetries 
and asymmetries. Direction or orientation comes neither from men nor from 
their preferences, from their inclinations, but from the inanimate world that 
precedes the living and from the living that precedes culture. Things lean to 
one side: force fields, boreal auroras, twisting turbulences, cyclones, spots 
on the planet Jupiter . . . the universe was born, it is said, from spontaneous 
symmetry breaking. Direction traverses the immensity of the sky, enters the 
box of details, and rides on the arrow of time.18
Serres insists that the motif of inclination is no abstract metaphysics or specula-
tive theory, and that it does not rely on a philosophical intuition or axiom like 
Badiou’s inconsistent multiplicity. Quite to the contrary, he argues, the condi-
tion of existence is evident and observable. We each experience it a thousand 
times each day, from when we observe the cosmic regularity of the sun “rising” 
and “setting” as the earth rotates on its axis and perpetually inclines in its orbit 
towards the sun, to when we pick up the right-handed implements most of us 
use every day without a second thought. This principle of inclination spans 
nature and culture, the sciences and the arts. It is a familiar principle, he argues, 
in molecular biology, information theory, crystallography, fluid dynamics, and 
of course also in the Lucretian clinamen that ruptures the symmetry of falling 
atoms.19 Without exception, everything inclines: “Orientation can thus be said 
to be originary, invariable, irreducible, so constantly physical that it becomes 
metaphysical.”20 To exist is to incline, to veer, to be off center.
This paradigm of inclination cannot be accounted for in terms of the same-
ness and alterity that govern both the philosophies of the same and of difference. 
The Lucretian clinamen does not produce simply more of the same, but nor does 
it rupture with what precedes it and introduce a radical alterity. We can see here 
a marked difference from the Derrida who insists on “absolute” alterity, and from 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s insistence on the incommensurability of singulars. For Serres 
there is no incommensurability, no radical alterity even as an ethical horizon, and 
even with the Derridean caveat of “if there is such a thing.”
Inclination, as well as being the principle of the natural world, also holds sway 
in culture and language. This once again sets Serres apart from thinkers like Derrida 
and Nancy, for it distances from his writing any thought that language necessarily 
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reduces the alterity of that about which it speaks.21 Nor is there any dichotomy, 
for Serres, between textuality and a pre-symbolic Real, or between truths and the 
inconsistent multiplicity they count as one. In whichever direction we look, no 
such basic divisions scar the landscape of Serresian thought: it is inclination all 
the way down, all the way back, all the way up, and all the way forward.
In The Birth of Physics Serres elaborates on Lucretius’s equation of atoms 
with letters and the view that, just as the swerve of atoms forms all the bodies 
in the universe, so also sense emerges through the drifting of letters against the 
background noise of language:
Everything drifts, whatever happens, from the original atoms, the backdrop. 
Everything drifts from the elementary roots: and so it is with words, these 
shifting aggregations of atom-letters. Here is the origin of meaning, the 
transverse lightning flash on the backdrop that is the background noise. 
Sense is nothing but its slope, it is the sense of the slope. It is another drift. 
Existence, time, meaning and language go down the inclined plane together.22
For the philosophies of difference language reduces alterity, but for Serres it per-
petuates inclination. In fact, inclination is operative for Serres at every linguistic 
level, including the semiotic, the semantic, and the narratological. In a series of 
four recent books23 he elaborates an understanding of the structure of stories as 
a series of inclinations or bifurcations, allowing him to embrace with a single 
motif both the narratives of human culture and what he calls the “Great Story” 
of the universe from its origin, through the asymmetries which cause the forma-
tion of planets and the inclinations that shape evolution. Similarly, he insists that 
thinking itself is leaning, and that all its discoveries and creations derive only 
from branchings, bifurcations, or ruptures of symmetry.24
The principle that characterizes Serres’s position at this point, and that dis-
tinguishes it from philosophies both of difference and of the same, is summed up 
in a phrase that he quotes repeatedly, beginning with his 1968 thesis on Leibniz 
and continuing in his most recent writings. The quotation comes from a point in 
Leibniz’s Philosophische Schriften where he quotes Nolant de Fatouville’s Comme-
dia dell’Arte play Arlequin, Empereur de la lune (Harlequin: Emperor of the Moon, 
1693). Given the constant reference to this quotation throughout the more than 
five decades of Serres’s work, it is as close as we will come to a brief summary of 
his own complex thought. Upon returning from his journey to the moon, the 
multi-colored Harlequin addresses a learned assembly eager to hear news of the 
strange world he has encountered, but the report they receive comes as a great 
disappointment. Harlequin tells his nonplussed audience that the lunar world 
“is just like here, everywhere and always,” only “with varying degrees of size and 
perfection.”25 What a disappointment to the learned assembly who were itching 
to hear of the exotic, the unheard-of, the Other. To say that even the most distant 
location is “just like here, everywhere and always” is not a phrase that could readily 
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be found on the lips of the philosophers of difference, and nor would it sit well 
with Badiou’s philosophy of the same. All alterity is also sameness, he is claiming, 
even that of the most exotic, far-flung, or inaccessible sort. To begin to probe the 
implications of Serres’s alterity-as-inclination, we turn now to the twin motifs of 
chirality and hermaphroditism.
Chirality and the Hermaphrodite26
Serres’s most sustained and explicit challenge to the dichotomy of alterity and 
sameness is in his as-yet-untranslated 1987 book L’Hermaphrodite: Sarrasine 
sculpteur. In the course of offering an innovative reading of Balzac’s short story 
“Sarrasine” he elaborates an account that privileges neither alterity nor sameness 
as customarily conceived, but that thinks about difference in terms of asymmetry, 
chirality, and enantiomorphy.27 According to Serres the character of Zambinella—
a castrato—provides Balzac’s reader with a meditation on alterity.28 In a move 
that is perhaps at first surprising (until we become familiar with Serres’s rejection 
of all ontologies of lack, at which point we realize that it is inevitable), he insists 
on reading castration not as a lack but as a hermaphroditic plenitude, a neutral 
potentiality that resolves to neither pole of the sexual binary: “Neutral expresses 
well enough the inclusion of the excluded middle: neither ‘neither one nor the 
other’ nor ‘both one and the other.’ Castration plays the role of the neutral ele-
ment, here, for every operation that brings alterity into play.”29
This hermaphroditic logic reappears regularly throughout the book, as well 
as elsewhere in Serres’s work, not least in an important series of reflections on 
chirality in which we find another challenge to the same/other paradigm. A left-
hander himself, Serres insists that sinistrality is not the opposite of dextrality, nor 
its ‘other’; still less is it the ‘same’ as right-handedness. In fact, the left-handed 
person is a “lateral hermaphrodite.”30 Our two hands are in a relation neither of 
identity nor alterity; rather they are enantiomorphs: symmetrical but not congru-
ent. In the final analysis, therefore, enantiomorphy reduces neither to identity nor 
to alterity, nor again to any mixture of the two. Two enantiomorphic structures 
are at the same time quite opposite and quite identical31 such that, as Serres puts 
it, the “same” and “other” have become twins.32
The logic of antithesis and the lexicon of identity and difference are wholly 
inadequate to describe this hermaphroditic difference, a relation which Serres 
dubs a “non-symmetrical symmetry”33 and “the most refined of alterities.”34 The 
left-hander is opposed to the right-hander while remaining identical,35 and this 
complex relation confounds the unsophisticated categories of “same” and “other,” 
just as it confounds the superposition of one hand exactly upon the other. Our 
hands are not identical—they cannot be interchanged. And yet they have reflec-
tional symmetry—they are not radically other:
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Who am I on this axis or on the surface of the reflective mirror at the center 
of my body, who am I with organs with no image, no model, no double, no 
equal? Where have the same and the other gone in the twinned enantio-
morphs that mirror each other in this mirror?36
“If we remembered this mirror that never leaves us,” insists Serres, “it would 
help us to understand . . . alterity.”37 Specifically, it would help us to understand 
that the notion of radical alterity so prominent in recent thought is only ever an 
abstraction from an original chiral inclination.
Elaborating on his own sinistrality in The Troubadour of Knowledge, Serres 
insists that the left-hander is not the equal and opposite of the right-hander. 
Forced to adapt to a world of objects designed for the dextral user, the left-hander 
develops capacities of which the right-hander knows nothing. This does not mean, 
however, that the left-hander is simply ambidextrous or enacts a Hegelian subla-
tion of dextral sameness and sinistral alterity:
Does the thwarted left-hander become ambidextrous? No, rather a crossbred 
body, like a chimera. Left-handed when it comes to scissors, the hammer, the 
scythe, the foil, the ball, the racket, the expressive gesture if not society—this, 
the body—the left-hander has never stopped belonging to the maladroit, 
sinister minority, as Latin has it; hurray for the Greek language, which dubs 
this minority aristocratic! But right-handed for the pen and the fork, he 
shakes the right hand upon being introduced—this, the soul. He is properly 
brought up for public life, but left-handed for caresses and private life. Those 
complete organisms have their hands full.38
There remains an un-recuperated remainder in the left-hander’s awkwardness 
and elaborate behavioral compensations, an incessant learning or inclination 
one way or another rather than a stable synthesis of left and right. She is stably 
unstable, metastable but not at rest. In short, for the left-hander “identity fits 
well with opposition and fullness with lack.”39
This complex enantiomorphy is a feature not only of our hands, of course, 
but of our bodies as well, and so whereas for Badiou I am just as infinitely other 
to myself as to anyone else, and for Derrida every other is wholly other, for Serres 
the picture is more complex:
Glass in a window or a mirror divides my body into two zones both same 
and other, enantiomorphs: our identity mixes in with our own alterity as 
confusedly as the androgynous Hermes and Aphrodite. Sarrasine extends to 
human affairs the problem of regions of space, and thus meditates on alterity. 
Who am I, me other [moi autre]?40
It is this complex alterity, Serres insists, rather than a unilateral valorization either 
of the same or of the other, that should govern our thinking and inform our ethics.
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The Parasite
The second Serresian motif that challenges philosophies both of the same and of 
difference is the parasite,41 a figure developed at considerable length in Serres’s 
1980 volume Le Parasite,42 and that, unlike chirality and the hermaphrodite, has 
been prominent in the Anglophone reception of his work to date.43 The parasite 
is neither the same nor the other, and in fact it confuses the distinction between 
same and other, as Serres explains in relation to La Fontaine’s fable “The town rat 
and the country rat.” In the fable the town rat invites the country rat to dinner, 
and during their feasting the two are interrupted (Serres assumes by the owner 
of the house in which the town rat lives). The “third man” intrudes upon the 
rats’ meal with a noise (bruit), which is one of the three meanings of the French 
parasite: the static or noise that interrupts a signal. Despite the house-owner 
“parasitizing” the rats, however, it is in fact this third who is himself parasitized 
by his hungry visitors.
The complex parasitical relations in La Fontaine’s fable help Serres to rethink 
the conventional account of sameness and alterity. The distinction between the 
same and the other shared by both Badiou and his antagonists requires, on Serres’s 
account, the prior expulsion of the third or the parasite, which is mistakenly 
thought to supervene upon or interrupt the exchange between self and other, a 
misunderstanding Serres illustrates with the following diagram, where I1 and I2 
are the two interlocutors, and P the parasite:44
In this customary but incorrect way of understanding alterity, a channel of 
(linguistic) communication or (economic) exchange is parasitized by a third 
instance which introduces static, miscommunication, and fraud. In La Fontaine’s 
fable, by contrast, “the guest becomes the interrupter, the source of noise becomes 
the interlocutor, the channel becomes an obstacle, and vice versa.”45 In other words, 
it is now radically impossible to decide who is the parasite and who is the host, 
who is the same and who is the other, who is the giver and who is the receiver, 
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and who interrupts whom. The linearity necessary for the identification of same 
and other is itself revealed as an artificial reduction of an originary, generalized 
parasitism. This, furthermore, is the condition of all relations. In Serres’s general-
ized parasitism “[t]he same and the other change places with the third” and “[a] 
diagram is needed where the branches are not determined and where the cuts 
are not specified”:46
This differs from, say, the Derridean insistence on the ambiguity between host 
and guest captured in the French term hôte,47 because Derrida problematizes the 
identity of host and guest while retaining the underlying structure of a bipolar 
relation between two instances, a bipolarity necessary for his account of radical 
hospitality. Derrida’s hôte is still working within the linearity of the first diagram, 
even as it problematizes the difference between I1 and I2. Serres, by contrast, 
challenges the structure of alterity at a deeper level through his insistence on the 
radical impossibility of conclusively identifying not merely host and guest but 
host, guest, and parasite.
In Le Parasite, Serres discusses La Fontaine’s fable “The Countryman and the 
Serpent,” in the course of which the eponymous reptile is cut into three pieces:
Which is the third part? Or who or what is the third, in this logic of the tren-
chant decision? Is the third excluded or not? Here we have a trivalent logic 
where we expected only a bivalent one. The same at the head, the other at 
the tail, or being at the head and nonbeing at the tail, and this middle trunk 
that is both same and other, being and nonbeing, and so forth.48
Both the philosophies of difference and of the same operate only after discard-
ing the serpent’s middle part, and Serres is drawing our attention, quite literally 
here, to the excluded middle, in French le tiers exclu (the excluded third), his 
522 Chris Watkin
insistence upon which distinguishes his position from philosophies of difference 
and sameness alike.
Furthermore, the second diagram reveals the poverty of the same/other para-
digm, as Serres explains in La Communication: “The most profound dialectical 
problem is not the Other, who is only a variety—or a variation—of the Same, it is 
the problem of the third man.”49 According to Serres’s generalized parasitism, the 
great danger is not the violent reduction of radical alterity to linguistic signification, 
nor is it the dissolution of truths in the miasma of endlessly circulating opinion, 
but it is rather in the very framework of the same/other distinction upon which 
philosophies of difference and philosophies of the same both rely, no matter with 
what nuances, caveats, and deconstructions they might festoon this binary schema. 
Compared to the nuance and subtlety of this generalized parasitism, Serres argues, 
seeking to understand relations in terms of the logic of the same and the other is 
like playing the piano while wearing boxing gloves.50
Implications
In both the philosophies of sameness and of alterity, an account of difference 
directly informs an ethics and a politics. Things are no different for Serres, despite 
some rather hasty conclusions in the secondary literature about the poverty or 
even the lack of a Serresian ethics.51 Serres’s ethics has been characterized as a 
“horror of violence and exclusion,”52 but in truth this barely touches the tip of 
the Serresian ethical iceberg. In this final section we will consider the distinc-
tiveness and potential of an ethics and politics that issue from Serres’s account 
of parasitic, chiral inclination.
Rethinking the Relation of the Local to the Global,  
and the Singular to the Universal
First, inclination and enantiomorphic alterity make us rethink the relation 
between the local and the global, the singular and the universal, and this chal-
lenges the philosophy of difference’s antipathy to totalizing discourse while also 
avoiding the devalorization of difference characteristic of sameness philosophy. 
In Geometry Serres notes how, “[i]n a violent but just reaction against perverse 
ancient ideas preaching a universal that’s almost always reducible to an imperi-
alistic and invading domination, our discourses, for at least a half-century, have 
rumbled with our differences.”53 This repudiation of imperialistic universality and 
its concomitant valorization of difference has also, however, come at the price of 
abandoning the aim of unitary synthesis as we “lose ourselves deliciously in the 
delicacies of the infinitely small, forgetful of the universal in favor of singularities 
that carry meaning.”54 In other words, we have become able to valorize the local 
and the singular only at the expense of the global and the universal.
Not More of the Same: Michel Serres’s Challenge to the Ethics of Alterity 523
In addition to this zero sum game between singularity and totality there is 
also an internal tension in the unilateral valorization of difference, namely that 
“by some perverse paradox, difference ends up imposing itself in turn as a uni-
versal dogma that everywhere and always forbids speaking in terms of always and 
everywhere.”55 The paradox may indeed be perverse, but it is also inevitable: the 
reductive dichotomizing of identity and alterity, compounded by their differential 
valorization, cannot but issue in a distorted premium on one of these two poles 
at the expense of the other. Highlighting the perverse consequences of such a 
position, Serres wryly asks, “is it only the local that can be expressed globally?”56
The problem is far from an intramural philosophical one, however. Having 
sought to content ourselves with differences with the noble aim of fostering peace, 
what we now find is that “in the name of these same differences twenty wars are 
flaring and raging today in singular localities of the world, bringing as many 
misfortunes to men as the imperialist conflicts generalized to the entire world 
brought to our youth.”57 It is no adequate response to the tyranny of the universal 
to institute a counter-tyranny of difference. What is needed is an approach that 
does not play off the local against the global, the singular against the universal, 
and this refusal to pit singularity against universality is what Serres’s own account 
of chiral identity and alterity offers us, with one very important caveat.
The caveat is that the Serresian response to the suite of problems inherent in 
understanding the relationship between the local and the global does not simply 
consist in arguing that every local inclination is an instance of the global condi-
tion of existence. Philosophies of difference perform such a move themselves, for 
example in Nancy’s singular plural or, mutatis mutandis, Derrida’s “every other 
is wholly other,” and Badiou can similarly claim that every locally instantiated 
truth is universal. What is different in Serres’s case is that the path from the local 
to the global knows no qualitative leap: the global is a network of localities, not 
something under which the local can be subsumed or into which it can be incor-
porated. When sameness and difference philosophies think the relation between 
the singular and the universal, they retain the Platonic structure of the Form and 
the particular, a structure according to which the universal is an idea in which the 
singular participates. For Serres, this approach can only ever conceive the global 
as an “inflated local.”58 Such an approach always struggles to grasp the universal, 
whereas Serres’s insistence that even the most alien locality is “everywhere and 
always” like here, “with varying degrees of size and perfection,”59 requires no Pla-
tonic leap from the local particular to the global universal. Local and global are 
co-implicated in the inclination and orientation that characterize all existence:
Orientation goes from the local to the global and from the small to the large, 
from atoms to stars, from inanimate matter to living matter, from crystals 
to shellfish, from nature to culture, from the pure to the applied, from space 
524 Chris Watkin
to time, from things to languages; thus it traverses, as well, and without dif-
ficulty, the passage(ways) that philosophy reputes to be the most delicate.60
In the continuation of the extract from Fatouville’s Arlequin, Empereur de la lune 
quoted above, many-colored Harlequin is forced by his disgruntled audience to 
divest himself of his coat, eventually stripping down to his naked and tattooed 
body. As the audience make to leave, however, they turn back in amazement 
and, looking at the spot where Harlequin had been standing a moment before, 
exclaim “Pierrot! Pierrot! . . . Pierrot Lunaire!”61 White, universal, and blank Pier-
rot stands in the place of the multi-colored, determinate, local Harlequin. Serres’s 
point is a chromatic one: white is not composed of an absence of color but of all 
colors; the universal and global are arrived at not by jumping out of the local in 
a puff of abstraction, but by multiplying local instances and seeking carefully to 
relate them to each other. The global for Serres is incremental, asymptotically 
approached through finding the complex northwest passages between particular 
localities, not acceded to in one transcendent leap.
What this means, as Marcel Hénaff notes, is that totality and the global are no 
longer to be seen, monodimensionally, as totalizing imperialisms to be avoided 
at all costs, nor as Badiouian truths incarnated in individual particulars, but as 
conditions of existence that emerge as we move from one locality to another: “the 
global does not pre-exist the local; it is the ensemble of their relations.”62 We do 
not reach the global by abstracting from or transcending the local, but by bringing 
into relation many different localities.
This chromatic way of understanding the local and the global circumvents the 
dangers of totalization and imperialism which so exercise the philosophies of dif-
ference. It is “a fully developed philosophy of mixture and hybridization, of identity 
as the sum or combination of varieties of otherness [combinaison des altérités],” a 
future philosophy of mixture that “connects the global and the local irenically, and 
presupposes a different ontology.”63 It is telling, then, that Peter Hallward identifies 
two tendencies in Serres’s thought, one particularizing and one holistic, which he 
finds it difficult to reconcile,64 and that N. Katherine Hayles similarly identifies 
“two voices” in Serres, a generalizing voice and a voice resistant to generality.65 
What Hallward’s and Hayles’s perplexity shows is that Serres’s account of alterity 
as inclination is not assimilable to the sameness/otherness paradigm in terms of 
which they are seeking to read him, but it describes a subtler alterity that is at work 
before the emergence of the forced dichotomy between the local and the global.
Challenging Radical Alterity
Secondly, Serres’s chiral and symmetry-breaking otherness leaves no place for 
the absolute or radical alterity that has its place in both Derrida’s and Badiou’s 
thought. This means that, from a Serresian point of view, difference philosophy’s 
respect for the irreducible alterity of the other, or sameness philosophy’s commit-
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ment to a universal truth that cuts across all differences, can no longer be seen 
as the ethical holy grail. In fact, radical alterity is reframed by Serres not as the 
antidote to violence or as that which must be overcome through perseverance 
to a truth, but as the very source and justification of violence: “The bit of noise, 
the small random element, transforms one system or one order into another. To 
reduce this otherness to contradiction is to reduce everything to violence and 
war.”66 Once more, to think in terms of sameness and alterity is already to have 
discarded the middle third of the serpent.
Serres’s own refusal to be complicit in this conspiracy of the excluded middle 
directly challenges the assumption of the philosophies of difference that violence 
is the reduction of alterity to the same. On Serres’s account, in fact, the moment of 
violence occurs before any supposed reduction of the other to the same. It occurs 
when chiral alterities or alterities of inclination are forcibly reduced to oppositions 
and contradictions in order that there may be a clear distinction between same 
and other in the first place. For Serres himself, by contrast, “[h]ell is the separa-
tion of paradise and Hell, the Devil is the bifurcation between God and the Devil, 
evil is the crossroads of good and evil, and error is the dualism that only opposes 
twins.”67 Those twins may be sameness and alterity as framed by the philosophies 
of difference, or the truths and opinions of Badiou. Both, for Serres, are equally 
in error, equally violent, and equally hellish.
What is violent, we could add, is the very assumption of the primacy of the 
same/other dyad such that it should need to be deconstructed in the first place, 
or such that, on Badiou’s account, truth should need to be preserved from dis-
solution into indifferent difference through an ongoing act of fidelity in the first 
place. On a Serresian view philosophies of alterity and philosophies of the same 
are equally violent in reducing the complex subtlety of inclinational, chiral, and 
parasitic alterity to the brute opposition of same and other. This is nowhere more 
vividly exemplified than in Serres’s ecological thinking, where time and again he 
insists on the earth and its ecosystem as the forgotten and excluded third in the 
exchanges between warring parties, their shared disregard for which is the condi-
tion of possibility of their conflict in the first place. It is only by ignoring this (quite 
literally) common ground that the parties can be constituted as antagonists, as 
Serres poignantly points out in relation to Goya’s famous depiction of two pugilists 
fighting with cudgels as they sink into the sand in which they are standing.68 If we 
desire conflict then we must begin by transforming enantiomorphic difference 
into the dichotomy of sameness and alterity shared by philosophies of difference 
and philosophies of the same.
Challenging the Paradigm of Exchange
Another important consequence of Serres’s account of alterity is its challenge to 
the idea that exchange relations are primary in both personal and political con-
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texts. The logic of sameness and difference common to Badiou and his antagonists 
predisposes us to understand politics in terms of an economy of exchange: once 
there is a difference between same and other then any relation between them is 
to be understood in terms of reciprocity, of unilateral or bilateral commerce, or 
its refusal. This is a prominent assumption in Derrida’s later work, for instance, 
when he considers the inevitable reciprocity of gift-giving or hospitality. It is also 
the paradigm that tacitly governs Badiou’s insistence on fidelity to a truth, which 
is precisely the refusal of exchange between truth and opinion.
For Serres, by contrast—and, I would argue, for all of us if we stop to think 
about it—parasitism is more fundamental than, and indeed the condition of 
possibility of, exchange, reciprocity, and the very distinction between same and 
other. Critiquing the well-worn dictum that society is founded on exchange, Serres 
emphatically replies:
No: the straight, asymmetrical, more elementary arrow incontestably gives 
the parasite the first, dangerous, tragic, exposed place. Legal right is required, 
at least, and morality, on top of that, to patiently construct the double arrow 
of globally balanced exchanges. Everywhere and always orientation begins; 
what remains to be constructed are the different balancing acts. Exchange, 
then, comes second.69
The sort of reciprocal exchange relations that govern the philosophies of dif-
ference and sameness always come after parasitic relations in at least two ways. 
First, that which is exchanged has always already been parasitically extracted 
from the earth, either in the form of quarried or harvested materials, or in the 
form of intellectual property generated through the parasitic consumption of such 
materials. Secondly, each of us parasitizes our mother and then our parents or 
carers for the first months and years of our life, before we enter into any formal 
economic exchange relationships.
Implicit in this realization is a Serresian critique of the exchange economy 
as a fundamental paradigm which, like the philosophy of alterity of which it is a 
mirror and whose structure it shares, excludes the parasitic relations that are its 
condition of possibility. Rather than perpetuate this fiction of the same, the other, 
and the relations of production and exchange between them, Serres insists on a 
generalized parasitism. The Serresian primacy of the parasite also challenges the 
insidious and destructive assumption, fostered by late capitalism, that the only 
relations of value are financially significant relations of exchange, and according to 
which only those tasks or jobs which receive financial remuneration are positively 
valued in terms of status and power. In place of this homo economicus with its 
assumptions of sameness, alterity, and exchange, Serres offers us homo parasitus 
which foregrounds the care-giving, child-rearing, earth-dwelling foundations of 
the economic that the paradigm of production and exchange predisposes us to treat 
as a hindrance to “true” productivity. Serres’s radical challenge to the primacy of 
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the same/other dyad, as also to the paradigm of production and exchange, offers 
transformative models to disability studies and gerontology, directly confronting 
the insidious stigma of “being a burden” by revealing parasitism as the fundamental 
and universal condition of existence, both human and non-human.
Conclusion
Serres’s relation to other recent French philosophers and the ethical and political 
implications of his work remain among the chronically under-explored aspects 
of his reception in the Anglophone world.70 The aim of this brief treatment has 
been to address these twin deficiencies, drawing out some contrasts between 
Serres’s account to alterity and that of recent philosophies which either positively 
value otherness or positively value sameness. By touching on three areas in which 
Serresian alterity issues in a set of ethical and political concerns and assumptions 
radically different from those of philosophies of difference and philosophies of the 
same, I hope at least to have begun to challenge the misconception that Serres’s 
ethical and political thought is a weakness in his writing. Finally, Serres’s chal-
lenges to common understandings of the universal, violence, and the paradigm 
of exchange can be of great use to a broad cross-section of arts and humanities 
scholars who are seeking alternative narratives to the now well-worked patter of 
fidelity to a truth or of avoiding the reduction of alterity to sameness.
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1. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy. The French title, Le Même et l’autre: quarante-
cinq ans de philosophie française (1933–1978) translates as “The Same and the Other: 
Forty-Five Years of French Philosophy (1933–1978).”
2. Descombes, Modern French Philosophy, 90.
3. May, Reconsidering Difference, 1.
4. May, Reconsidering Difference, 2. May’s language is echoed by Steven Connor when 
he argues that the tradition of twentieth-century European philosophy “has been 
preoccupied to the point of mania with alterity.” Connor, “Thinking Perhaps Begins 
There,” 578.
5. May, Reconsidering Difference, 2.
6. Badiou, Ethics, 25/L’Éthique, 43; AB’s emphasis.
7. Badiou, Ethics, 26/L’Éthique, 44.
8. Badiou, Ethics, 25/L’Éthique, 43.
9. Badiou, Ethics, 27/L’Éthique, 46.
10. Badiou, Ethics, 28/L’Éthique, 47; AB’s emphasis.
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11. Badiou, Ethics, 27/ L’Éthique, 46; AB’s emphasis.
12. Badiou, “Behind the Sacred Law, There is Fear.”
13. Badiou, Ethics, 47/L’Éthique, 69.
14. Any meaningful consideration of each of the thinkers discussed by May in Recon-
sidering Difference would overspill the length of this article. I shall engage primarily 
with Derrida in the sections that follow, with a brief discussion of Nancy, building 
up an indicative but not exhaustive picture of how Serres’s account of otherness 
differs substantially from those philosophies which code alterity positively. It is 
also important to note that the present article does not and cannot aim to situate 
Serres’s account of alterity in a wider context still, engaging with thinkers such as 
Gilbert Simondon, Bruno Latour, and François Laruelle. My present purpose is to 
show that Serres’s account of alterity exposes similarities between, and cannot be 
assimilated to, Badiou and his antagonists.
15. Derrida, Donner la mort, 98/The Gift of Death, 77; translation altered.
16. See, for example, Serres, The Birth of Physics/La Naissance de la physique dans le texte 
de Lucrèce. See also L’Hermaphrodite; Le Tiers-Instruit/The Troubadour of Knowledge; 
Le Gaucher boiteux.
17. See, for example, Serres, Le Gaucher boiteux, 87, and Serres, Legros, and Ortoli, 
Pantopie, 86.
18. Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, 14/Le Tiers-Instruit, 36–37; translation altered.
19. Serres, Le Gaucher boiteux, 76–77.
20. Serres, The Troubadour of Knowledge, 15/Le Tiers-Instruit, 38.
21. It is not that Derrida and Nancy—or Deleuze, for that matter—consider language 
and the world to be radically different to each other. This is the perennial misun-
derstanding of Derrida’s “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” which confuses “text” with 
“syntactic language.” Derrida is quite happy to say that the living cell, for example, 
is a text. Nancy, for his part, is equally happy to move effortlessly from the material 
to the conceptual in his account of beings in L’Expérience de la liberté and elsewhere. 
What sets Serres apart from thinkers like Derrida and Nancy at this point is not his 
insistence that there is no dichotomy between language and the material world, but 
the persistence, in the latter thinkers, of the idea that language necessarily reduces 
the difference of that about which it speaks.
22. Serres, The Birth of Physics, 34/La Naissance de la physique, 46.
23. See Serres, Hominescence; L’Incandescent/The Incandescent; Rameaux; and Récits 
d’humanisme. I consider the narratological implications of Serres’s recent work in 
“Michel Serres’ Great Story: From Biosemiotics to Econarratology.”
24. Serres, Le Gaucher boiteux, 78.
25. Serres, Le Système de Leibniz et ses modèles mathématiques, 1; CW’s translation. 
Quoted by Serres from Leibniz, Die philosophischen Schriften, 6:548. All translations 
from Serres’s Leibniz are my own.




27. Chiral (from the Greek kheir, hand) describes a crystal or three-dimensional form 
which is “not superposable on its mirror image.” An enantiomorph (from the 
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Dictionary.
28. Serres, L’hermaphrodite, 78, 99.
29. “Neutre exprime assez bien l’inclusion d’un tiers-exclu: ni l’un ni l’autre ou et l’un 
et l’autre.
La castration joue le rôle d’élément neutre, ici, pour toute opération mettant en jeu 
l’altérité,” Serres, L’hermaphrodite, 96; CW’s translation.
30. See Le Tiers-instruit, 36/The Troubadour of Knowledge, 13.
31. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 74.
32. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 71.
33. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 70.
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about bilingualism. See Le Tiers-instruit, 26/The Troubadour of Knowledge, 6.
35. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 74.
36. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 71.
37. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 71.
38. Le Tiers-instruit, 35–36/The Troubadour of Knowledge, 13.
39. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 74–75.
40. Serres, L’Hermaphrodite, 99.
41. In addition to the hermaphrodite and the parasite, other Serresian personae could 
be drawn upon to develop these themes further. The “troubadour of knowledge” (le 
tiers-instruit) would be an important reference, as would Hermes, angels, and the 
Harlequin/Pierrot doublet.
42. Serres, Le Parasite/The Parasite.
43. See Baran, “Predators and Parasites in Le Père Goriot”; Brown, “Michel Serres: 
Science, Translation and the Logic of the Parasite”; Burton and Tam, “Towards a 
Parasitic Ethics”; Clegg, Kornberger, and Rhodes, “Noise, Parasites and Translation”; 
Guilherme, “Michel Serres’ Le Parasite and Martin Buber’s I and Thou”; Lanone, 
“Parasites, or the Politics of Textual Poetics in Ben Okri’s the Famished Road”; 
Raffel, “Parasites, Principles and the Problem of Attachment to Place”; Thompson, 
“Productive Parasites: Thinking of Noise as Affect”; Wolfe, “Bring the Noise: The 
Parasite and the Multiple Genealogies of Posthumanism”.
44. The diagram can be found on Le Parasite, 74/The Parasite, 53.
45. The Parasite, 53–54/Le Parasite, 74.
46. Serres, The Parasite, 54/Le Parasite, 74. The diagram can be found on Le Parasite, 
74/The Parasite, 53.
47. Jacques Derrida and Dufourmantelle, De l’Hospitalité/Of Hospitality.
48. Serres, The Parasite, 23/Le Parasite, 36.
49. Serres, Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, 66–67/ Hermès 1, 41.
50. Serres, Le Parasite, 78/The Parasite, 57.
51. “Serres is, I fear, much less persuasive, much less invigorating, when he tries to show 
the implications and applications of this thought. In considering the question of 
evil, for example, he can become prosaic, formulaic, parochial, prescriptive, even a 
little monomaniac, often grotesquely against the grain of his own thought.” Connor, 
“Wherever: The Ecstasies of Michel Serres.” “There seems in Serres’s recent work to 
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